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aBstract
Most philosophical debate over mental causation has been concerned with 
reconciling commonsense intuitions that there are causal interactions be-
tween the mental and the physical with philosophical theories of the nature 
of the mental that seem to suggest otherwise.   My concern is with a different 
and more practical problem.  We often confront some cognitive, affective, or 
bodily phenomenon, and wonder about its source – its etiology or its under-
lying causal basis. For instance, you might wonder whether your queasiness 
due to something you ate, or whether it is just nervousness, or whether your 
aunt’s memory loss is a neurological problem or a psychological response to 
trauma. Such questions attempt to localize the causes of a phenomenon at 
some level in the complex multi-level systems that we human animals are.  
In this paper I will attempt to tease out the sense of level implicit in such 
questions, and to show how it is related to current mechanistic accounts of 
levels. I will argue that the explanation of our practices of level attribution is 
deeply pragmatic. Such attributions are often attempts to locate the causes 
of problems, and to identify interventions that could solve those problems.
Keywords: levels of organization, mental causation, mechanistic explana-
tion, mind-body problem
Most philosophical debate over mental causation has been concerned with rec-
onciling commonsense intuitions that there are causal interactions between 
the mental and the physical with philosophical theories of the nature of the 
mental that seem to suggest otherwise. On a Cartesian view, how can mental 
substance interact with physical substance? On more recent views, how can 
mental properties have causal powers if they supervene on physical properties 
already sufficient for the effect?
†  Butler University.
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I shall say a few things about these issues in the course of this paper, but my 
main concern will be with a different and more practical problem. Very often we 
confront some cognitive, affective, or bodily phenomenon, and wonder about its 
source – its etiology or its underlying causal basis. For instance, we might ask:
 - Is the problem with Tiger’s golf swing mental or physical? 
 - Is my queasiness due to something I ate, or is it just psychological? 
 - Is my aunt’s memory loss a neurological problem or is it a psychological 
response to trauma?
These are questions about where to locate causal responsibility for some 
phenomenon. When answers are given they typically are expressed using ad-
jectives like ‘mental’, ‘physical’, ‘neurological’, ‘developmental’, ‘cognitive’, 
and so on. These adjectives appear to refer to different kinds, or different lev-
els, of causes or causal processes. These questions are challenging because the 
phenomena we seek to understand depend upon many kinds of causes oper-
ating at multiple levels. If, for instance, psychological processes depend upon 
neurological and ultimately physical processes, it is prima facie odd to try to 
single out one level of causal responsibility.
My aim in this paper will be to explore the basis upon which such questions 
can be answered. I will begin with an overview of various conceptions of levels, 
and will in particular try to understand how claims about mental and physical 
levels are connected to what I take to what I take to be the most ontologically 
significant conception of levels, what I call, following (Craver, 2007), levels 
of mechanisms. In part II, I will review some elements of my own mechanistic 
account of causation, with an emphasis on how it makes sense of the kinds of 
inter-level causal claims that appear to be at play in judgments about levels of 
causal responsibility. In parts III and IV, I will return to the question of how we 
identify the causal basis of phenomena in systems, like human brains, which 
involve multi-level causal mechanisms. I will suggest that in many cases, such 
questions are asked within a context in which the phenomena are taken to be 
problems. This problem context provides constraints, which allow us to find 
levels at which the problem occurs (where the mechanism is “broken”) as well 
as levels at which one could intervene to solve the problem.
1. Levels and Mechanisms
Reference to levels is commonplace in science and medicine. Consider, for ex-
ample, the definition of a mental disorder from the most recent addition of the 
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5):
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant dis-
turbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that 
reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental 
processes underlying mental functioning (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2013, sec. I).
This definition does not use the word ‘level’, but it does refer to three distinct 
kinds of processes, and these processes, I would argue, are thought to occur 
at some level. We see this implied in part by the notion that the psychologi-
cal, biological and developmental underlie mental functioning. These levels are 
clinically important, as they will impact our understanding both of what the 
disorders are and how they should be treated.
But what are levels? It is common to think of levels both as features of the 
world and as features of the organization of scientific fields and their products 
(Craver, 2007, chap. 5). Often it does no harm to ignore this distinction, because 
of correspondences between levels in nature and levels in the disciplines that 
study them: psychologists study the behavior of humans and cognitively similar 
animals; sociology studies the behavior of societies (groups of these animals) 
and so on. But it does not take long for difficulties to arise. The major scientific 
disciplines study the natural world at a wide range of scales. Physics operates 
from the sub-atomic to the super-galactic; biology, from molecules to ecosys-
tems. Even fields that appear to be focused more narrowly (organic chemistry, 
invertebrate biology, etc.) deal with systems with multiple levels of organization. 
Chemistry, for instance, operates at “the molecular level” – but molecules them-
selves come in vastly different sizes and degrees of organizational complexity; 
larger molecules are not simple aggregations of atoms, but have multiple levels 
of substructure that are central to understanding their behavior.
Given that a good deal of work in both metaphysics and philosophy of sci-
ence appeals to levels, the literature on levels is surprisingly sparse. Within phi-
losophy of science, classic accounts of inter-theoretic reduction (Oppenheim & 
Putnam, 1958; Nagel, 1979) assume both that there is a linear ordering of levels 
in nature (part-whole microreduction) and that these orderings correspond to a 
hierarchy of scientific disciplines. In the philosophy of mind one often finds an 
even simpler idealization of levels and inter-level relations. Early statements of 
the identity theory, as well as Davidson’s anomalous monism and Kim’s account 
of the causal exclusion problem typically refer to (Kim, 1998; Davidson, 1970) 
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two levels – the mental (or psychological) and the physical.1 These accounts also 
see a direct correspondence between levels of scientific description and levels 
of things in the world. They move largely without comment from discussions of 
mental and physical predicates or statements to discussions of mental and physi-
cal properties or events. I do not mean to suggest that these philosophers are 
unaware that there are more levels than just the mental and the physical, or that 
there is a distinction between predicates and properties; but do think these com-
mon features of philosophical discussions indicate a sense in these communities 
that these facts are not germane to the philosophical issues.
One of the first philosophers to think about the consequences of the mess-
ier reality of levels was Bill Wimsatt (1972; 1976). Wimsatt is a realist about 
levels, seeing levels as grounded in hierarchies of compositional relations be-
tween parts and wholes as they exist in the world. In this respect, his account 
resembles the micro-reductionist picture. But Wimsatt recognizes that com-
positional relations of this kind will not give the linear ordering that Oppen-
heim and Putnam imagined. Instead there is a vast and bushy partial ordering 
corresponding the various ways in which some set of fundamental entities ag-
gregate into things as diverse as proteins, rock formations, stellar clusters and 
social groups (cf. Love, 2011).
Wimsatt argues that levels are intimately bound to what he calls ‘perspec-
tives’:
Perspectives involve a set of variables that are used to characterize systems 
or to partition objects into parts, which together give a systematic account 
of a domain of phenomena, and are peculiarly salient to an observer or class 
of observers because of the characteristic ways in which those observers 
interact causally with the system or systems in question (Wimsatt, 2007, 
p. 227).
Wimsatt calls perspectives ‘quasi-subjective’. They are points of view on what 
objects or systems within a domain are doing. What makes them quasi rather 
than genuinely subjective is that these points of view allow scientists to selec-
tively attend to genuine aspects of what the things they observe are doing. The 
screen-writer, the camera operator, the director and the diction coach are all 
watching the scene, and each has a different point of view on what the actors are 
1  Matters are not helped by an ambiguity in the term ‘physical’. There is the physicists’ sense of physical 
and the physician’s sense.  In ordinary discourse about mind and body, ‘physical’ means ‘bodily’.
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doing. They will break up the scene and the actors’ performances in different 
ways, but the things they attend to (the lines, the camera angle, the blocking, 
the accents) are all aspects of what is really going on.
Wimsatt’s views on levels anticipate and inform much of the work on hi-
erarchically organized mechanisms that goes under the banner of “the new 
mechanism”.2 Though there is considerable debate about exactly what should 
or should not count as a mechanism, for purposes of this paper I will assume 
that any mechanism must at least satisfy a condition I call minimal mechanism:
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose activities 
and interactions are organized so as to be responsible for the phenomenon.3
I shall not try to explicate the concept of minimal mechanism here, but will 
highlight a few features that are relevant to our discussion.
First, mechanisms are always mechanisms for something. They are individ-
uated by the phenomena for which they are responsible. Engines are mecha-
nisms for rotating drive shafts, the cardio-pulmonary system is a mechanism 
for transporting oxygen and nutrients to various parts of the body, and so on. 
When a phenomena arises as a result of the activities of a mechanism, we can 
call that phenomenon mechanism dependent. The mechanism’s phenomenon 
plays very much the role of Wimsatt’s perspectives in governing decomposi-
tions. There are many ways that a system can be decomposed into parts, and is 
only by identifying what a mechanism is doing that one can articulate the parts 
by which the mechanism is doing it (Kauffman, 1970). 
Many of the phenomena for which mechanisms are responsible may be 
thought of as functions of the mechanism, but the minimalist conception of 
mechanism places few constraints on what should count as functions. From 
the minimalist point of view, a car may be a mechanism for getting to the gro-
cery, but it is just as much a mechanism for melting the ice cream that you left 
in the back seat. We can think of there being a functional relation between 
mechanisms and their phenomena, but it is in the weak sense of a causal role 
function, rather than in terms of any account of etiological or proper function. 
2  Well-known accounts of mechanisms include (Glennan, 1996; Glennan, 2002a; Machamer, Darden, & 
Craver, 2000; Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver, 2007). For introduc-
tions to the literature and a survey of some debates among new mechanists see (Glennan, 2015).
3  This conception of minimal mechanism is defended in (Glennan, forthcoming; cf. Illari & Williamson, 
2012). Illari and Williamson and I argue new mechanists should accept it as a minimal condition, and that 
disagreements are mostly about whether minimal mechanism is too permissive.
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Second, mechanisms are spatiotemporally localized. The phenomena for 
which mechanisms are responsible are produced or maintained by the causally 
organized activities and interactions of mechanism’s parts, and the spatial and 
temporal organization that gives rise to this causal organization. The engine’s 
capacity to rotate the crankshaft, for instance, depends upon the precise ar-
rangement of parts (e.g., rods, pistons, cam shafts, spark plugs, fuel), and the 
various sorts of activities and interactions they engage in (e.g., sparking, burn-
ing, rotating).
Third, mechanisms can be both systems and processes. In the systematic 
sense, mechanisms are complex objects that do things. A heart, for instance, 
is a mechanism for pumping blood. Mechanical processes, on the other hand, 
are ordered and orchestrated sequences of activities and interactions of enti-
ties that typically lead from a start state to an end state, or perhaps in a cycle 
of states. Metabolic processes like photosynthesis or the ATP cycle are mecha-
nisms in this sense. These two senses are interrelated, because the capacities of 
mechanical systems arise from processes involving their parts.4
Fourth, mechanisms are hierarchical in the sense that the parts and their 
activities and interactions can be broken up into further parts and their activi-
ties and interactions. This feature of mechanisms has particularly been empha-
sized by Carl Craver, who represents it schematically in figures like Figure 1.
Here the xs represent the parts of the mechanisms, the φs, their activities 
and interactions. Reading from left to right we see a mechanical process, by 
which some start up condition (represented by the left-most arrow, triggers a 
sequence (including possible cycles) leading to a termination condition (the 
right-most arrow. The xs are parts of a system S, and their collective activities 
and interactions are what constitute the system’s phenomenon – i.e., the activi-
ties in which the system as a whole engages (Sψ-ing).
Mechanisms are hierarchical. A mechanism (Sψ-ing) may be embedded in a 
larger mechanism, and the parts of a mechanism (the xs φ-ing) may themselves 
be mechanical systems whose behavior will be produced by the activities and 
interactions of their parts. Activities and interactions, like entities, are decom-
posable. The interactions represented by the arrows typically involve complex 
mechanistic processes, which are constituted by further entities whose activi-
ties are responsible for the larger activity.
4  Given the minimal conception of mechanism it will not always be the case that mechanical processes 
involve the operation of mechanical systems. Such processes are instances of what I call ephemeral mecha-
nisms (Glennan, 2002b; Glennan, 2010b).
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As an illustration, consider the mechanism of the action potential. An ac-
tion potential is a process by which the membrane of a neuron depolarizes and 
repolarizes – the characteristic spiking by which neurons “fire”. The firing of 
the neuron is an activity (ψ) of the cell as a whole (S), but the cell has the capac-
ity to generate an action potential only in virtue of the organization of its parts. 
The cell, for instance, has a membrane, and this membrane has various sites 
(the ion channels) which allow passage of charged ions across the membrane, 
leading to the membrane’s depolarization. The opening and closing of these 
channels are examples of components of the mechanisms and their activities. 
Again, the parts of the mechanisms have parts (membranes and ion channels 
are complex structures which themselves have parts), and the mechanism itself 
is part of larger mechanisms and its activities will be stages in these larger ac-
tivities. One neuron’s firing is part of the vast patterns of neural firings that are 
essential for the central nervous system as a whole to engage in its activities.
The hierarchical account of mechanisms sketched here leads naturally to an 
account of what Craver (Craver, 2007, chap. 5; Craver & Bechtel, 2007) calls 
mechanistic levels. Two entities are on the same mechanistic level just in case 
they are both parts of a mechanism, and a mechanical system is one level up from 
the parts that constitute it. In terms of the figure, the xs are at one level, and S is 
at the level above. Dotted lines represent the constitution relation.5 Mechanis-
5  Here and throughout this paper I will use the term ‘constitution’ in the proprietary sense of mechanis-
tic constitution – the relationship between a mechanism and the entities, activities and interactions that 
make it up. This use of the term ‘constitution’ was introduced by Craver and is now well-established in 
Figure 1: A schematic view of a mechanism (Craver, 2007, p. 7) 
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tic levels are a kind of compositional level, where parts are at a lower level than 
the wholes which they make up, but the parthood relation is determined by the 
activities of the parts, and whether these parts contribute to the activities of the 
whole.6 Entities, activities or interactions can only be judged to be at the same 
or different level when they are involved in the same mechanisms. There is no 
answer to the question about whether a rock on a distant planet and a microbe 
in our ocean are on the same or different level, because they aren’t part of any 
common mechanism. Since mechanistic levels are only defined within a mecha-
nism, mechanistic levels are essentially local (cf. Love, 2011).
Though mechanistic levels describe the fundamental hierarchical organiza-
tion of complex systems in the natural world, most levels talks refers to these 
structures only loosely. Adjectives like ‘neurological’, ‘mental’, ‘cognitive’ and 
‘developmental’ are best understood as referring to what I will call “heuris-
tic levels”. These levels (and you could call them kinds, so long as you didn’t 
think of kinds from an essentialist perspective) clump together a somewhat 
heterogeneous set of entities, activities, systems and processes. For instance, 
neurological processes and mechanisms include the activities of single neurons 
and their parts, as well as synapses and larger structures involving, bundles of 
nerve fibers, tissues and brain regions. Moreover, a mechanism that fits within 
a heuristic level will typically span multiple mechanistic levels. For instance, 
the visual mechanism for shape recognition would typically count as a cogni-
tive mechanism, but the processes underlying the phenomenon of shape rec-
ognition operate at mechanistic levels ranging from those inside single cells to 
higher levels involving the organized activities of various tissues within the eye, 
or various regions of the visual cortex.7
Although they are loose, heuristic levels help localize the causes of phenom-
ena. If we learn the problem with Tiger’s swing is mental, we really have said 
the mechanisms literature. The term ‘constitution’ also has a history in recent metaphysical debates (e.g., 
Baker, 1997), where constitution is a “made up of” relation, but not one between mechanisms and their 
parts. It is instead a relation between two whole things – like a statue and the marble of which it is made or 
a person and her body. I shall not try here to unpack the relation between these two senses. 
6  Space prevents me from considering when a set of parts constitutes a mechanical system, and how (or 
if) one can separate a mechanism from its environment. Many have been skeptical of Craver’s attempt to 
mark this boundary, and Craver himself (2013) argues that such boundaries do not exist except from the 
perspective given taking some event or state as the phenomenon for which the mechanism is responsible.
7  Heuristic levels are not local in the way that mechanistic levels are, because they provide a way of clas-
sifying widely distributed sets of particulars. One might for example, find instances of cognitive processes 
in systems found in distant parts of the galaxy.
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something about where things are going wrong. We shall return to these levels 
in the last two sections of the paper. But first we need to show how to make 
sense of inter-level causal claims on the mechanistic account.
2. Causation in Multi-level Mechanisms
Both the definition of minimal mechanism and examples we have discussed 
imply that mechanical processes and systems are causal structures. The sense 
in which they are responsible for phenomena is a causal one. While some (e.g. 
Woodward, 2013) argue that mechanisms are simply certain kinds of causal 
structures, and see causal relations as being more basic than mechanisms, I 
have argued (Glennan, 1996; 2011; 2010a; forthcoming) that mechanisms 
underlie causation, in the sense that mechanisms are truthmakers for causal 
claims. Specifically, causal claims are existential claims about mechanisms (cf. 
Waskan, 2011): an event a causes an event b is true just in case there is a mecha-
nism whereby a contributes to the production of b. 
Many recent discussions of causation suggest that there are two concepts 
of cause, or two kinds of causal relations – difference making (or dependence 
or causal relevance) and production (Glennan, 2010a; Hall, 2004; Menzies, 
1999; Woodward, 2011). Theories of causation can be classified according to 
which sort of causal relationship is taken as primary, and mechanistic approach 
fits within the production tradition. 
Production accounts emphasize the continuity between causes and effects 
and give primacy to singular causes. On the other hand, difference-making ac-
counts are comparative or contrastive: causes are things that make a difference 
relative to actual or counterfactual circumstances in which the cause does not 
occur. For instance, one might claim that a mutant allele is the cause of a dis-
ease because organisms with the mutant allele develop the disease, while those 
without it do not. The mechanistic theory takes production as basic, because 
causal relations are not essentially contrastive, and require the existence of 
productive causal processes connecting cause to effect. What makes a a cause 
of b are facts about mechanical processes actually connecting a and b and not 
anything about what does or would have happened in other circumstances. 
Even so, difference-making is a central feature of causal and explanatory 
claims, and a mechanical theory must make sense of them. To see how, consider 
a canonical form of singular causal claim which references both relationships 
(Glennan, 2010a; forthcoming):
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Event c produced event e in virtue of relevant feature p.
For instance:
Elliot’s throw of the bowling ball produced a strike in virtue of its speed and 
launch angle.
On a mechanistic theory of causation, this claim would be true if there were a 
mechanical process whereby the throw is connected to the knocking down of 
the pins. That process would involve multiple stages, the roll of the ball down 
the lane, the striking of the first pins, and chain reactions as those pins knock 
down others. The point of the relevance claim is to allow one to express the fact 
that certain features of the entities and activities involved in the process make a 
difference to the event, while others do not. Clearly the speed and direction of 
the toss would make a difference, as would the weight of the ball, but the color 
of the ball or the sound it makes as it rolls down the alley would not.
So far we have focused on a simple process operating at a single mechanistic 
level. Let’s consider how the mechanistic account works for inter-level causal 
relations. Craver and Bechtel (2007) have argued that the correct way to under-
stand such cause-effect relationships is in terms of what they call a “mechanisti-
cally mediated effect” – a hybrid between intra-level causal relations and inter-
level constitutive relations. To illustrate their approach consider this example: as 
my fingers type on the keyboard, their motions are controlled by the contraction 
of muscle fibers attached by tendons to bones in my finger. How exactly do these 
muscle contractions work? There are quite a number of levels just within the 
muscle. Muscle tissue (1) consists of bundles of cells called myocytes (2) which 
contain with them large quantities fibers called sarcomeres (3). Sarcomeres in 
turn are composed of collections of filaments (4) made of the proteins myosin 
and actin (5), and the contraction of sarcomeres, arises, as actin bands are pulled 
along the fixed myosin bands, powered by ATP (Krans, 2010). It is tempting to 
see the contraction of muscle fibers as an example of bottom-up causation – the 
muscle contraction is caused by the contraction of the myocytes, which is caused 
by the contraction of the sarcomeres which is caused by the sliding filaments 
within the sarcomeres. But this, for Craver and Bechtel, is a mechanistically me-
diated effect. All the causation is actually within level – for instance, the pulling 
of the actin along the myosin bands, or the pulling of the bone by the contracting 
muscle. But the contraction, say, of the sarcomere isn’t caused by the sliding of 
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the filaments that make up the sarcomere. The contraction of the sarcomere just 
is the sliding of those filaments. Schematically, the contraction of the sarcomere 
is S ψ-ing, and the sliding of the bands within the sarcomere are the xs φ-ing. 
They don’t cause the contraction; they constitute it. 
This example also gives us an example of top-down, and mental causation. 
What is ultimately causing the many highly orchestrated muscular actions that 
lead to my fingers striking the keys is my intent to put certain words on the 
virtual page. That basic intent is about all that is within my conscious control. 
I am not aware of the intent to type certain letters, or certainly to move my 
fingers in any certain way. As I am fluent in English and a touch typist, all of 
this is automatic. Nonetheless, it is the high level conscious intent that seems to 
cause all lower level events, from the firing of motor neurons to the expenditure 
of ATP in actin-myosin reactions. All of these though are mechanistically me-
diated effects. My intention to type the word ‘myosin’ activates certain motor 
neurons that control muscles in my fingers, but my intention is constituted by 
the activities of neurons distributed across various regions of my brain. And 
it is the intra-level interactions of those neurons with motor neurons and ulti-
mately muscle cells that cause the muscle contractions which move my fingers 
across the keyboard.
When applied to cases of mental causation, Craver and Bechtel’s account 
of mechanistically mediated effects leads very naturally to a version of identity 
theory. My intent to type the word ‘myosin’ is a mental event, but that event is 
identical to some neurological event, and hence there is no difficulty in this 
neurological event causing other neurological events, like the activation of mo-
tor neurons, since the events are all at the same level. 
This identity theory is, however, a token identity theory, and a mechanisti-
cally mediated effect is a token effect. The theory does not identify psychological 
and neurological events as types. As such, the theory can honor intuitions that 
in cases of mental causation, it is high-level mental properties rather than neu-
rological properties that are really the difference makers. Take again the case 
of typing. What is the common difference-making property in virtue of which 
I type the letter ‘m’ on the many occasions that I do so? It can be nothing other 
than my intent to type an ‘m’. Any given token of this intent is identical to some 
transient neurological state, but because the neurological context changes, one 
should expect that further tokens will have somewhat different neurological 
properties. And of course the tokenings will differ more substantially across 
different brains. What binds these neurologically diverse states together is their 
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occupying the same causal role, and the different tokenings have some higher 
level similarities that allow them to do this. For this reason we can say that high 
level mental properties, like intentions are difference-making causes.8
Craver and Bechtel’s account of mechanistically mediated effects strictly 
speaking bans inter-level causation, but it does explain the sense of claims of 
top-down and bottom up causation, and as I’ve construed it, it saves the causal 
relevance of the mental. It thus begins to answer the question ‘When is it men-
tal?’ A phenomenon is mental when it is in virtue of mental properties of events 
that it occurs. But this is only the beginning of an answer, because in general 
properties at multiple levels can make a difference to a phenomenon, and we 
need some account of why some levels are chosen as primary or central.
3. Causes and Problems
When we assert that phenomenon is of some (heuristic) level, we often mean 
that the phenomenon itself occurs at that level. A sensation or a belief is mental 
in this sense, while a swollen knee is physical. But my concern in this essay are 
assertions not about the level of the phenomenon itself, but about its causes, 
i.e., about the mechanisms responsible for it. For instance, we might say of an 
LSD induced hallucination that it is a chemical phenomenon, meaning that the 
event that caused it was the ingestion of a chemical. Had the hallucination been 
initiated by an ecstatic experience in a tent revival meeting, we might instead 
have called it a psycho-social phenomenon. In either case, the hallucination 
itself would be mental, but our causal explanation of the hallucination would 
appeal to events and mechanisms at different levels. 
In light of the multi-level character of mechanistic processes, it is far from 
clear what principles are at work in identifying “the level” of the cause. Psycho-
logical processes are neurological processes, and neurological processes bio-
chemical ones, so why favor one level over the other? I cannot hope to explore 
all of the constraints that explain level attributions, so I will focus on a particu-
8  There are other ways to interpret this situation. John Heil and David Robb (Heil, 2013; Heil & Robb, 
2003) have argued that strictly speaking there are no higher level properties at all. The only real proper-
ties are the properties that belong to basic substances, perhaps some elementary physical properties. All 
other properties are just compounds of these basic properties of the basic substances. What I am calling 
higher level properties they treat simply as abstract descriptions of complex objects that are in truth noth-
ing but modification of the basic substances and their properties. I have sympathy for this position, but for 
me the fact that there are objective similarities that account for objectively similar causal powers across 
these complex objects is enough to get genuine higher-level properties – but I will not argue the point here.
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lar class of cases that I will call problems. Classifying phenomena as problems is 
a normative exercise that involves distinguishing the problematic phenomena 
from alternative phenomena that are taken to be normal.
For instance, when we ask about what’s wrong with Tiger’s swing, we are 
suggesting his current swing has problems, and we are in so doing implicitly 
contrasting it with other swings. The question then becomes, what is it that is 
different about the mechanisms responsible for Tiger’s swings now that distin-
guishes them from those responsible for his earlier unproblematic swings? Is 
it mental – perhaps induced by anxieties about bad media coverage  – or is it 
really about a physical injury to his knee? 
When we identify some phenomenon as a problem, we seek not just to ex-
plain it, but also to correct it. A solution to a problem is an intervention that 
eliminates or at least mitigates the problem. Often the level of the problem and 
the level of the solution coincide  – a knee problem requires a physical therapist, 
a mental problem a psychotherapist – but this is not always the case. 
To explore the considerations that lead us to identify a problem or its solu-
tion as mental, physical or otherwise, I want to focus on problems of human 
health. The problem of impotence – in contemporary clinical parlance, erectile 
dysfunction (ED) – will provide a good initial example that can help us under-
stand the various factors which lead to ascribing the causes of phenomena to 
some level. Often, I shall argue, the levels we choose say as much about our 
technology, our economics, our moral attitudes and our politics, as about the 
nature of the phenomenon itself.
Failures of sexual performance are paradigms of physical problems with 
mental causes. Writing in the late 16th century, Michel de Montaigne recog-
nized this in his remarkable essay “On the Force of the Imagination”. Of pe-
nises he complains:
The indocile liberty of this member is very remarkable, so importunately 
unruly in its tumidity and impatience, when we do not require it, and so 
unseasonably disobedient, when we stand most in need of it: so imperiously 
contesting in authority with the will, and with so much haughty obstinacy 
denying all solicitation, both of hand and mind (Montaigne, 1877).
For Montaigne, impotence is an example of ways in which mental imaginings 
can cause physical failings. He recounts stories of sexual failures of men who 
believing themselves to be in enchanted, or simply in remembering theirs or 
others’ past disasters, are unable to get erections and have sex with their part-
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ners. In modern parlance, we might say “they psych themselves out”. These 
causes clearly are at a mental level, in the sense that the mechanism which pro-
duces the effect involves perceptual and cognitive processes. Stories of curses 
must be heard, believed and remembered to have an effect.
Montaigne also recognized that there were mental solutions to the problem 
of impotence, in the sense that psychological interventions could alleviate the 
problematic behavior. He recounts a story in which he sought to aid a friend 
who, on his wedding night, thought himself to be cursed by a jealous former 
suitor of his new wife. In case of troubles, Montaigne gave his friend detailed 
instructions on a set of elaborate rituals involving, among other things, a me-
dallion engraved with «celestial figures» that he assured him would cure him, 
and the treatment did the trick. Montaigne remarks:
These ape’s tricks are the main of the effect, our fancy being so far seduced 
as to believe that such strange means must, of necessity, proceed from some 
abstruse science: their very inanity gives them weight and reverence (ibid)
Writing in the 16th century, Montaigne has already recognized the remarkable 
power of the placebo effect.
Montaigne’s essay supports intuitions that the causes of impotence (ED) 
can be psychological, but ED can have physical causes as well. The Mayo Clin-
ic’s website guide to ED in fact explicitly divides its list of potential causes be-
tween the physical and the mental. Among the physical causes it mentions heart 
disease, clogged blood vessels, obesity, diabetes, alcoholism, and «surgeries or 
injuries that affect the pelvic area or spinal cord» (Mayo Clinic Staff, 2015). 
Psychological causes include stress, anxiety, depression and relationship prob-
lems. ED, like many other disorders of mind and body, is a syndrome – a cluster 
of symptoms with different causes in different cases. ED in one patient may be 
a result of blood flow problems due to obesity, whereas in another it may be due 
stress diminishing hormonal response in sexual situations. Syndromes are not 
natural kinds. There are no laws describing their operation, and no universally 
effective prescriptions for treatment. From a mechanistic perspective, none of 
this is surprising. The mechanistic account of causation stresses that causes 
and effects are singular events and states of affairs that are connected by lo-
calized processes. Causal generalizations are approximate descriptions of the 
behavior of idealized types, but the reality varies from case to case (Glennan, 
2011; Glennan forthcoming).
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Focusing on the single case constrains the levels question, but it does 
not resolve it. Even in the single case, causal processes are multi-level, so we 
need an explanation of how to single out particular levels of those processes 
as causally relevant to the phenomena. The key to offering such an account 
is to recall that causal relevance (and with it the relevant level of causes) is a 
comparative notion. The causally relevant level is the level at which causes 
make a difference. But if difference-making is comparative, what is the com-
parison to? Here is where are focus on problems is helpful. By contrasting 
problematic phenomena with normal phenomena (or pathological phenom-
ena with healthy phenomena), one can look for the components or activities 
that are functioning abnormally. In other words, one can find at what location 
and level the mechanism is broken.
The minimal conception of mechanism does not distinguish between 
properly functioning and broken mechanisms. Mechanisms are just the causal 
structures that are responsible for phenomena – problematic or not. But the 
minimal conception can be augmented by placing a normative constraint on 
the relationship between a mechanism and the phenomenon for which it is re-
sponsible. Such a conception is provided by Justin Garson’s (2013) «functional 
sense of mechanism». On Garson’s view, the crucial thing about mechanisms in 
the functional sense is that they may malfunction: «“mechanism”, as commonly 
used, is normative—mechanisms are the sorts of things that can break—and the 
normativity of mechanism is best explained by the normativity of function» 
(2013, p. 320). Garson does not insist on any particular theory of normative 
functions, but he does require that function is more than causal role. There are 
not, in this sense, pathological mechanisms. Pathologies are instead breakings 
of functional mechanisms.9
Garson argues that the functional sense of mechanism is useful «because… 
[t]hinking about pathologies as the result of broken mechanisms, rather than as 
“having” their own mechanisms, helps researchers integrate information about 
the etiology of disease with information about function, in such a way as to en-
hance the explanatory and predictive power of biomedicine» (ibid., p. 318). We 
9  While I agree with Garson that thinking of pathologies as breakdowns of mechanisms is a useful strat-
egy, in some biomedical contexts researchers speak of disease mechanisms. This conceptualization can 
also be clinically useful. Instead of trying to figure out how to fix the broken “healthy” mechanism, one 
instead considers as “normal” the mechanical processes by which the disease progresses, and figures out 
how to disrupt that mechanism. So, for instance, in some hormonally fed cancers (as some forms of breast 
or prostate cancer), one disrupts the growth by suppressing production of estrogens or androgens.
156 Humana.Mente - Issue 29 - December 2015
can see just how such a strategy works in the diagnosis and treatment of ED. If 
a patient suffers from ED, the aim is to isolate which of the many mechanisms 
involved in normal sexual function is broken, or is being interfered with. For in-
stance, the problem may be a vascular problem – blood vessels supplying blood 
to the penis may be constricted. On the other hand, it may be stress related. 
Stress responses in the autonomic nervous system suppress sexual arousal. The 
system of stress response is not what is broken. The problem lies in whatever 
psychological conditions and mechanisms are triggering the stress response at a 
time when sexual arousal is a normal response.
While attending to breakdown helps us assign a level of causal responsi-
bility, there is nothing to say that breakdowns will be localized to one mecha-
nism or one level. Very often interaction effects will make the phenomena truly 
multilevel. The Mayo Clinic website makes this point about ED: «…[A] minor 
physical condition that slows your sexual response might cause anxiety about 
maintaining an erection. The resulting anxiety can lead to or worsen erectile 
dysfunction». In cases like this, difference-making causes (and breakdowns) 
are both mental and physical.
Thinking about problems helps to identify contrasts and to find relevant 
difference makers, but it brings with it important and ineliminable pragmatic 
elements. In the case of human health and behavior, to identify some phenom-
ena as problems and others as not is to make social and moral judgments about 
the acceptable range of behavioral norms. What is a «clinically significant 
disturbance», as DSM-5 puts it, is a consequence of social norms. In the con-
temporary medical community variations in sexual orientation are taken to be 
acceptable, but this was not always so. Homosexuality used to be a disorder. If 
a gay man failed to be aroused in a sexual encounter with a women, the failure 
would be due to a defect of sexual orientation. Such a view may strike us as un-
enlightened or even bigoted, but it is not hard to find cases in which things that 
we now accept as real problems involve appeal to norms that are historically 
contingent and potentially problematic. Consider again ED. ED is a widely 
diagnosed and treated disorder in large part because of cultural norms, sup-
ported in part by the advertising budget of the pharmaceutical industry, which 
create the expectation that men should continue to be sexually active well past 
middle age. But decreased capacity for sex (and fertility) is a common accompa-
niment of the aging process. The use of limited medical resources to treat this 
as a curable disease may be a consequence of economic and gendered power 
differentials that are justifiably cause for scrutiny.
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Here is a different example to consider, which will highlight some other 
features of level ascription. Obesity research suggests that the feelings of hun-
ger and satiety which trigger our eating and cessation of eating are regulated 
in part by two hormones, ghrelin and leptin. Ghrelin is produced in the stom-
ach and gut when the stomach is empty, and appears to stimulate feelings of 
hunger by binding receptors in the hypothalamus. Leptin, mainly secreted in 
adipose tissue (body fat), is released as energy stores increase, and triggering 
feelings of satiety, also through a pathway in the hypothalamus (Klok, Jakobs-
dottir, & Drent, 2007). 
If this were the whole story, it would be appropriate to classify hunger as 
a gastro-intestinal and hormonal phenomena – that is to say, as mental phe-
nomena whose underlying causes are gastro-intestinal and hormonal. Hun-
ger is caused by ghrelin which is caused by empty stomachs. But the mental 
may be implicated in these processes in more subtle ways. Perhaps the causes 
of hunger pangs in part psychological. We are all familiar with the ways in 
which our desires to eat are affected by our psychological state. I for instance 
at this moment am struggling to handle my usual case of the writing-inducing 
munchies. But how do psychological events and states do this? A recent study 
entitled “Mind over milkshakes” (Crum, Corbin, Brownell, & Salovey, 2011) 
suggests one way. Crum and her colleagues studied ghrelin response to the 
consumption of milkshakes. The two groups of subjects consumed identical 
380 calorie milkshakes with different labels – one was labeled a “sensible” 
milkshake with 180 calories, while the other was labeled an “indulgent” 
milkshake with 620 calories. The researchers reported that «[t]he mindset of 
indulgence produced a dramatically steeper decline in ghrelin after consum-
ing the shake, whereas the mindset of sensibility produced a relatively f lat 
ghrelin response. Participants’ satiety was consistent with what they believed 
they were consuming rather than the actual nutritional value of what they 
consumed» (ibid., p. 424).
While this is another case of the causes of phenomena turning out to be 
mental, it has somewhat different features than the ED example. In the first 
place, this result is not supposed to show something about any specific case 
of hunger, but to show something general about the sources of hunger pangs 
across individuals, and across time within individuals. Relatedly, it is not obvi-
ously about a problem. This research suggests a mechanism by which beliefs 
about food consumed, and not just the food itself, can affect feelings of sati-
ety, but it does not suggest that this mechanism is abnormal or pathological. In 
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highlighting hunger as a mentally-caused, the researchers are not suggesting 
that beliefs are the primary cause of feelings of hunger or satiety, but simply 
highlighting it as a hitherto unidentified part of a multi-level mechanism.
4. Solutions
We have discussed two different circumstances under which a phenomenon 
may be said to be of some level. First, there is the level of the phenomenon itself, 
as when we call hallucinations mental. Second, there is the level of the causes 
that produce, underlie or sustain phenomena, as when we call LSD-induced 
hallucinations chemical. In the final part of this paper I want to consider a third 
kind of level – the level of interventions that could change a phenomena. In-
terventions meant to change or correct the behavior of multi-level systems can 
typically operate at many different heuristic levels, so the challenge is to figure 
out why some levels might be preferred.
Think for a moment about a program running on a computer. How may 
we alter its behavior? One way is to change the program, another is to change 
the hardware (say by adding memory), and a third way is to unplug it. The pro-
gram’s behavior is thus, in this sense, both a software phenomenon, a hardware 
phenomenon and an electrical phenomenon. We may say similar things about 
human behavioral phenomena. Say a man is suffering from acute anxiety. What 
level of intervention can change this? Perhaps he can be calmed by interper-
sonal interventions – talking to him, touching him, and so on. He could also 
perhaps self-soothe by various actions like exercising or engaging in a favorite 
activity. One could also administer a sedative or even – though let’s hope not – 
knock him out with a blow to the head.
Here again, constraints can be found by considering phenomena that are 
problems, and figuring out which interventions could count as solutions. 
Knocking a person on the head may alleviate anxiety in the short term, but it 
is hardly a solution to an anxiety problem. If the aim of the intervention is to 
restore someone to a healthy or normal state, the object would be to find an 
intervention that would target the source of malfunction in the most specific 
way possible, with the fewest possible side-effects.
But this constraint, while significant, does not imply there is a unique level 
for an intervention that counts as a solution. For many psychiatric disorders 
both talk therapies and pharmacological interventions can improve functioning, 
helping restore a person’s mood and behavior to something more like a normal 
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condition. This means that disorders like depression are in this third sense both 
psychological and chemical problems, because they admit both of psychologi-
cal and chemical solutions. Contemporary treatment practices often involve a 
multi-pronged approach involving both talk-based and pharmacological inter-
ventions. To the extent that this multi-pronged approach is more effective than 
either talk-based or pharmacological interventions alone, it is even more appro-
priate to say that these disorders are both chemical and psychological.
The level of a solution will not always match the level of the causes that pro-
duce, underlie or sustain the problem. Take for example the case of various 
clinical symptoms caused by traumatic experiences. While it is possible to in-
tervene at the same level of the traumatic experience – say by using desensitiza-
tion therapy – it may be that the most effect approach involves pharmacological 
interventions.
Whether something is subject to an intervention at a particular level is de-
pendent upon the epistemic situation, and particularly upon the availability 
of technologies for intervention. No doubt much of the reason that Montaigne 
interpreted impotence as a psychological problem was the fact that psychologi-
cal interventions were the only interventions available to address the problem. 
Nowadays we have Viagra and Cialis. At the present time, pharmacological and 
other medical interventions are typically not powerful and specific enough to 
restore those with behavioral disorders to something like normal function, but 
it may be that this will change with time. Right now, we may be inclined to think 
of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) primarily as a psychological problem 
– both in the sense that its causes are mediated through perceptual mecha-
nisms (i.e., perception and recall of traumatic experiences) and that the best 
available therapies involve psychological interventions by therapists, groups 
etc. But perhaps in the future our capacity to surgically alter memories will be 
such that the offending experiences may be effectively excised. Were this to 
happen, PTSD would look more like a neurological problem.
Beyond the obvious epistemic and pragmatic factors like cost and availabil-
ity of therapeutic techniques, what can be said generally about the criteria by 
which one decides which level intervention is “better” and hence, at what level 
the problem may be said to be? Two plausible candidates are that interventions 
should specific and stable (Waters, 2007; Woodward, 2010). The stability of 
a cause refers generally to the degree to which it has the same effect across a 
variety of background conditions. Stable causal relationships represent practi-
cally better opportunities for intervention because they are more reliable. Sup-
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pose for instance that there is a drug that under some background conditions 
reduces anxiety while under other conditions greatly increases it. For instance, 
its effect might be highly sensitive to the level of some hormones with the brain. 
To the extent that these levels varied either within or across individuals, such a 
drug would not have a stable effect, and would not be an effective intervention. 
Relatedly, and more realistically, it appears to be a common feature of many 
pharmacological treatments of psychological disorders that their effectiveness 
decreases over time. An anti-depressant that had a positive effect on mood for 
some months might cease to be effective, at least at its current dose. To this 
extent, the pharmacological intervention is non-stable.
Specificity has, as Woodward has suggested, two related but distinct mean-
ings. On the one hand, causes are specific to the extent that fine-grained 
changes in a cause will lead to correspondingly fine grained changes to an ef-
fect. Woodward uses the example of an amplifier’s controls to illustrate. The 
power is a non-specific cause of the sound coming from the amplifier, while the 
volume dial is a specific one. The dial allows one to finely tune the volume, and 
is thus specific, in a way in which the on-off switch is not. Both the position of 
the power switch and the position of the dial are causally relevant to the volume, 
but only the dial controls it. Turning off the power with the power switch off to 
control the volume is analogous to knocking a person out to control their anxi-
ety. We don’t count this non-specific intervention of knocking someone out as 
a solution to their anxiety problem, because it did too much. Solutions require 
fine grained interventions that solve the problem and not more. 
The second sense of specificity is connected to the idea of one-cause one-
effect. For instance, one speaks of an antibiotic as specific to the extent that it 
targets only a limited number of bacterial strains. No cause, and no interven-
tion ever has just one effect, but given some chosen set of variables, it is possible 
for interventions to affect more or less of them, and in the limit only one. One 
benefit of talk-based therapies is they can be more specific, in the sense that 
they can address cognitive and affective patterns surrounding very specific 
events, memories or behaviors. A therapist working with a patient can seek to 
manipulate a patient’s response to specific memories or environmental cues in 
a way that currently drugs simply cannot. To the extent that the problem, what-
ever it is, responds to these specific treatments, that makes the problem more 
of a psychological than a chemical problem.
While considerations about specificity and stability go some way towards 
explaining choices for clinical interventions, it would be naïve to think that 
 When is it Mental? 161
these considerations fully determine those choices, and with it our under-
standing of the kind or level of the problems they address. Richard Lewontin 
points out that the preference for identifying individual-level micro-causes in 
biomedicine may say more about dominant political ideologies than about the 
causal structure of the world. As an example, he cites the question of the cause 
of tuberculosis:
It is certainly true that one cannot get tuberculosis without a tubercle ba-
cillus… but that is not the same as saying that the cause of tuberculosis is 
the tubercle bacillus…. [T]uberculosis was a disease extremely common in 
the sweatshops and miserable factories of the nineteenth century, whereas 
tuberculosis rates were much lower among country people and in the upper 
classes. …[W]e might be justified in claiming that the cause of tuberculosis 
is unregulated industrial capitalism, and if we did away with that system of 
social organization, then we would not need to worry about the tubercle 
bacillus (Lewontin, 1993, p. 42).
Lewontin’s suggestion then is that this is not a microbial problem, but a social 
one.
A similar story can be told about the search for the causes of and solutions 
for the global obesity epidemic. While I have no reason to doubt the validity of 
the Crum et al’s findings, the research does seem consistent with a pattern in 
biomedicine of looking for causes within us rather than in our environment. 
The research is interesting in part because it suggests possible partial solutions 
to obesity problems by manipulating labelling to affect individual’s sense of 
satiety. But while this sort of intervention might well have an impact, this kind 
of research should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that the principle causes 
of the global obesity epidemic are likely changes to the food supply. Changes 
of diet that lead to the increased consumption of meat, fat, and processed sug-
ars are doubtless major explanatory factors. Obesity is in this sense a social 
problem, and it is quite likely that the most effective solutions would be social 
ones that changed the character of the food supply. But to do this would require 
challenging the political and economic power of the food industry. How much 
easier to just call it a psychological problem!
The world is replete with phenomena that are the result of the operation of 
multi-level mechanisms. My aim here has been both to offer an account of how to 
understand inter-level causal claims in these mechanisms, and also to suggest 
some of the epistemic and pragmatic features that lead us to pick out certain 
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of these levels as particularly explanatorily salient or as appropriate areas for 
causal intervention. We’ve found that there are criteria grounded in the causal 
structure of multi-level mechanisms that can provide rationales for ascribing 
levels to problems, their causes and their solutions. But these constraints are 
not sufficient to explain actual choices or to work as norms. For that we need 
the assistance of those who study science and medicine as social phenomena.
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